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512 ESTATE OF JANES. [18 C. (2d) 
[L. A. No. 17219. In Bank.-Aug. 27, 1941.] 
Estate of HARRY C. JANE'S, Deceased. IVA A. VROOM, 
Appellant, v. DOROTHY LEE JANES CURTISS. Re-
spondent. 
[1] Trial-Findings-Form-Inclusion in JUdgment.-Findings of 
fact may be included in a judgment or order. 
[2] Wills-Probate-Order-Recitals.-A statement in an order 
denying probate of a will that "the court being satisfied from 
said evidence that the instrument offered for probate in 
connection with such petition for probate of will is not the 
last will and testament of said decedent, and that the said 
deceased died intestate," is a sufficient finding of the ultimate 
facts in issue. 
[3] Id. - Probate - Evidence - Notation Attached to Will.-A 
notation, attached to a will but not incorporated therein by 
reference, to the effect that it is a copy of the testator's last 
will the original of which is in his safe deposit box, is admissi-
ble in evidence not as part of the will, but on the issue of the 
testator's int~nt. .~ 
[4] Id.-Testamentary and Non-testamentary Writing-Showing 
of Intent-Parol Evidence.-Evidence outside a will may be 
introduced, not to alter its provisions, but to show that it 
was not intended by the testator to be effective as a will. 
[5] Id.-Construction-Province of Court-Review.-The proper 
interpretation of a notation attached to an instrument to the 
effect that it is a "copy" of a will is a question of law in the 
absence of extrinsic evidence, which question may be re-
viewed on appeal from an order denying probate. 
[6] Id.-Construction-Avoidance of Intestacy.-The effect of a 
notation attached to an instrument to the effect that it is a 
"copy" of a will should be determined in the light of the cir-
cumstances of the. case and the policy of the law favoring 
testacy, rather than intestacy. A will that is complete and 
valid on its face should not be denied probate except upon the 
presentation of convincing proof that it was executed without 
testamentary intent. 
2. See 24 Cal. Jur. 975; 26 Cal. Jur. 1071. 
5. See 6 Cal. Jur. 328; 26 Cal. Jur. 879. 
McK. Dig. References: 1. Trial, § 322; 2. Wills, § 468; 3. Wills, 
§ 465 (4); 4. Wills, §202; 5. Wills, § 270; 6. Wills, § 286 (1) j 
7, 9. Wills, § 210; 8. Wills, § 249. 
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[7] Id. - Testamentary and Non-testamentary Writing-Writing 
Held Testamentary-"Copy".-An instrument which on its 
face purports to be a complete and valid holographic will 
and which is accompanied by a notation to the effect that it 
is a "copy" of a will should be admitted to probate in the 
absence of extrinsic evidence as to the meaning of the word 
"copy" and in view of the testator's death-bed statements as 
to a testamentary disposition in accordance with the instru-
ment in question, and as to the presence where the instru-
ment was found of instructions as to things to be done after 
his death. (Estate of Harris, 3 Cal. App. (2d) 606, 40 Pac. 
(2d) 566, disapproved.) 
[8] Id. - Revocation - Disappearance of Instrument - Presump-
tion.-The mere inability to find a so-called original will does 
not prevent probate of a will accompanied by a notation that 
it is a "copy" on the theory of a presumed revocation, and that 
the revocation of one instrument revokes duplicates (Prob. 
Code, § 76) where there is no evidence that anyone had ever 
seen the "original" will and the only evidence of its existence 
was the statement in the notation. When the missing will 
is a duplicate in the decedent's possession, all the facts bear-
ing on the possibility of revocation, including a death-bed 
statement regarding a bequest in accordance with the pur-
ported copy, must be considered in determining whether a 
presumption of revocation arises. 
[9] Id. - Testamentary and Non-testamentary Writing-Writing 
Held Testamentary-"Copy".-Either of two or more valid 
duplicate wills may be probated if there is no evidence indi-
cating that the missing copy was destroyed with intent to 
revoke, and if there is no basis in its disappearance for a 
presumption of revocation. The stringent requirements for 
proof of lost or destroyed wills are inapplicable in such case. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County denying probate of document as will Kurtz 
Kauffman, Judge pro tem. Reversed. 
S. S. Hahn and W. O. Graf for Appellant. 
Leo V. Youngworth and J. Harold Decker for Respondent. 
TRA YNOR, J.-This appeal is from an order of the su-
perior court denying a petition for the probate of a document 
alleged to be the last will and testament of· Harry C. Janes. 
The decedent died on December 9, 1938, in the county of Los 
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Angeles at the age of 66 years. .After his death appellant, 
a chiropractor who had been attending him professionally for 
· several years, found the purported will in a suitcase belonging 
,to him. The instrument on its face is a valid holographic 
,will. Attached tothe instrument; however, is a slip of paper, 
unsigned and undated; on which appears in decedent's hand-
· writing: "This is a copy of ;my last Will, the original' is in 
my safe deposit box." No other will was found in decedent's 
safe deposit box or among his effects. 
'.The' will offered for probate is dated November 1, 1938, 
and contains a bequest of $5000 and two automobiles to the 
appellant. The residue of the estate is left to Dorothy Le.e 
,J"anesCurtiss, the decedent's daughter, who is named execu-
',true: There is evidence that the night before decedent died 
, ':he told appellant that he was leaving her $5000 and his two 
)cars, and that he insisted that appellant go to his apartment 
for a suitcase containing the ownership certificates to the auto-
mobiles and instructions as to what should be· done after his 
'death. Appellant found in the suitcase the purported will, 
as well as decedent's life insurance policy, a draft for $250 
· to be filled out and sent to his daughter, the ownership certifi-
cates to the automobiles, instructions concerning his funeral 
· and the disposition of his body, and an authorization to ap-
pellant to take charge of his personal effects. 
The trial court, finding that the purp'orted will was not 
decedent's last will and testament and that he died intestate, 
denied the petition for probate. 
Appellant objects to the asserted failure of the trial court 
to make findings of fact. The court's' order, however, in-
· eluded the following: " ... and the Gourt being satisfied 
.from said' evidence that the instrument offered for probate in 
connection with said petition for probate of will is not the 
last will and testament of the said decedent, and that the said 
deceased died intestate .... " [1] Findings of fact may 
be included in a judgment or order. (Hopkins v. Warner, 
109 Cal. 133, 139 [41Pae. 868] ; Hibernia Savings & Loan 
Society v. Clarke, 110 Cal. 27, 32 [42 Pac. 425] ; In re Bens-
field, 102 Cal. App. 445, 448 [283 Pac. 1121. See Estate of 
Exrerstein, 2 Cal. (2d) 13, 15 [38 Pac. (2d) 151J.) [2] 
The court's finding was upon the ultimate fact in issue and 
was therefore sufficient. (See cases cited in 24 Cal. Jur. 975.) 
.~ 
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[3] Appellant contends that the notation attached to the 
will is not admissible in evidence and cannot affect the opera-
tion of the document as a will because it was not incorporated 
by reference therein. It is not necessary, however, for the 
notation to be incorporated by reference since it is admissible, 
not as part of the will, but upon the issue of testamentary 
intent. [4] Appellant maintains that the parol evidence 
rule as applied to wills does not permit the introduction of 
extrinsic evidence to show that a testator did not intend as 
his last will and testament an instrument that purports to be 
such on its face. It is clear, however, that evidence outside 
the will may be introduced, not to alter its provisions, but 
to show that it was not intended by the testator to be effective 
as a will. (Wigmore, Evidence, (3rd ed.) sees. 2413, 2421; 
Clark v. Hugo, 130 Va. 99 [107 S. E. 730J; In re Wt'lliam's 
Estate, (Tex. Civ. App.) 135 S. W. (2d) 1078.) 
[5] The question therefore is whether the decedent's 
designation of the instrument in question as a "copy" is 
sufficient, standing alone, to justify the trial court's implied 
finding that the testamentary intent necessary to make the 
instrument a valid will was lacking. Since there was no 
extrinsic evidence as to the meaning attached to the word 
"copy" by the decedent, the proper interpretation of the 
notation is a question of law (See 9 Wigmore, Evidence, (3rd 
ed.) 522; and cases cited in 6 Cal. Jur. 328) which may be 
reviewed on appeal. (Texas Co. v. Todd, 19 Cal. App. (2d) 
174, 185 [64 Pac. (2d) 1180]; Wall v. Equitable Life Assur. 
Soc., 33 Cal. App. (2d) 112,117-118 [91 Pac. (2d) 145].) 
[6] The effect of the notation should be determined in the 
ligh t of the other circumstances of the case and the policy of 
the law favoring testacy rather than intestacy. (Estate of 
Spitzer, 196 Cal. 301, 306 [237 Pac. 739].) An interpreta_ 
tion of a will that prevents intestacy is preferred (Prob. Code, 
section 102; .Estate of Northcutt, 16 Cal. (2d) 683, 690 [107 
Pac. (2d) 607] ; Estate of Fay, 145 Cal. 82 [78 Pac. 340, 104 
Am. St. Rep. 17]), as is a construction favoring validity, in 
determining whether a will has been executed in conformity 
with statutory requirements. (Estate of Wilkinson, 113 Cal. 
App. 645 [298 Pac. 1037] ; Estate of Durlewanger, 41 Cal. 
App. (2d) 750 [107 Pac. (2d) 477].) "When a man of 
~ound mind and memory, by his own hand and signature, has 
plainly made a disposition of his property, the courts should 
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carry out his intention if it can be done without violating the 
mandates of the law." (Estate of Fay, supra, at p. 87.) A 
will that is complete and valid on its face should not be denied 
probate except upon the presentation of convincing proof 
that it was executed without testamentary intent. 
[7] The designation of an instrument as a "copy" is not 
alone· sufficient to establish that the decedent lacked testa-
mentary intent in executing the instrument. The word 
"copy" implies that the instrument so labeled is identical 
'with another instrument. It does not indicate that the 
"copy" was intended· to be less effective as a will than the 
instrument which preceded it. There is no reason why a 
testator may not execute two valid wills with identical provi-
sions to insure the execution of his wishes should one of them 
be accidentally lost or destroyed. If it is properly executed, 
a copy of a will is in effect the same as a duplicate (In re 
Dawson's Estate, 277 Pa. 168 [120 Atl. 828]. See Great 
W esternPo'U)er 00. v. Oakland, 196 Cal. 131, 136, 137 [236 
Pac. 3071; 1 Burrill's Law Dictionary (2nd ed.) 526), and it 
is clear that a properly executed duplicate may be admitted. 
to probate. (See 1 Alexander, Commentaries on Wills, 137.r' 
In the present case the instrument presented to the court 
for probate is on its face a complete and valid holographic 
will. It states that it is the testator's "last Will and Testa-
ment." (cf. Estate of Major, 89 Cal. App. 238 [264 Pac. 
542].) The existence of testamentary intent is borne out by 
the decedent's declaration on his deathbed that he had made 
a testamentary disposition of his property in accord with the 
provisions of the instrument in question, by his statement 
that the suitcase contained instructions as to what should be 
done arter his death, by the presence in the suitcase of all the 
documents dealing with the disposition of his property and 
. affairs aft~r his death, and by the fact that no other will could 
be found: . The notation designating the will as a "copy" is 
not sufficient, in. the absence of other evidence as to the dece-
dent's meaning, to establish a lack of testamentary intent in 
.executing the instr~ment as a will. 
The. decision in Estate of Harris, 3 Cal. App. (2d) 606 [40 
Pac. (2d) 566], cited by respondent, must be confined to the 
facts of that case. There, two inc()nsistent holographic wills 
were found, each dated the same day and each marked 
U,Copy" upon the face of the document itself. One was 
I 
I 
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found after decedent's death among letters and receipts in 
a drawer of her desk, and the other with duplicate income 
tax reports. There was evidence that at least one original 
will had existed, and no evidence of continued testamentary 
intent. Insofar as the opinion in that case is inconsistent 
with the principles here stated, it is disapproved. 
[8] The failure to find the so-called original will after 
decedent's death does not prevent the probate of the will in 
question. If a will last seen or known to have been in dece-
dent's possession cannot be found after his death, it is pre-
sumed that he destr()yed it in his lifetime with intent to 
revoke it (Estate of Ross, 199 Cal. 641 [250 Pac. 676]), and 
the revocation of one instrument revokes all duplicates. 
(Prob. Code, section 76.) In the instant case, however, there 
was no evidence that anyone had ever seen the" original" will 
and the only evidence of its existence was decedent's state-
ment in the notation. The decedent might have intended to 
execute another copy of his will to be kept in his safe deposit 
box and failed to do so; but this would not prevent the pro-
bate of the will produced. (Parrott v. Parrott's Adm 'x, 
270 Ky. 544 [110 S. W. (2d) 272]; 1 Page on Wills (Life-
time ed.) 132. See In re Zell's Estate, 329 Pa. 312 r198 Atl. 
76] . ) Under these circumstances, there is no evidence to 
support the theory of a revocation. 
Moreover, when the missing will was a duplicate in dece-
dent's possession, all the facts bearing upon the possibility 
of revocation must be considered in determining whether a 
presumption of revocation arises, not solely the circumstance 
that one of the duplicates cannot be found. (See 35 Harv. 
L. Rev. 626; 1 Alexander, supra, 140.) In the instant case, 
decedent's statement regarding his bequest to appellant was 
made only a few hours before his death. Had he desired to 
revoke his will, he could easily have destroyed the instrument 
produced. (See Estate of Thompson, 44 Cal . .A.PP. (2d) 774 
[112 Pac. (2d) 937]; Glockner v. Glockner, 263 Pa. 393 [106 
Atl. 731].) Since intent is essential to revocation, (Prob. 
Code, section 74 (2) ; 1 Page, supra, 764; 1 Alexander, supra, 
140) these circumstances showing that decedent did not intend 
to revoke the will prevent any presumption of revocation from 
arising. 
[9] The statute relating to lost or destroyed wills has no 
application because the petition did not seek to probate a lost 
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or destroyed will, but a complete, valid holographic will. If 
valid' duplicate wills are executed, either may be probated if 
there is rio evidence indicating that the missing copy was 
, destroyed with intent: to revoke, and if there is no basis iIi 
its 91sappearance for a presumption of revocation. The 
stringent requirements. for proof of lost or destroyed wills 
are imposed to avoid fraud. In the instant case the existence 
of fraud is preciudedby the production of a valid will exe-
cuted by the testator, together with evidence that it contained 
the disposition that he wished to make of his property, and 
that' it was in his possession until the time of his death and 
could have been destroyed by him had he wished to revoke it. 
For these reasons, the finding of the trial court was not sup-
ported by the evidence and its order denying probate is there-
fore reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and 
Carter, J., concurred. 
[Sac. Nos. 5420, 5447. In Bank.-Aug. 27, 1941.] 
J. J. FLEJMING et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. J. R. 
BENNETT et at, Defendants and Respondents; A. C. 
BARHAM et al., Appellants. 
[1] 'Waters - Procedure-Trinl-Rcference-Time of Ordering.-
Under the Water Commission Act, § 24 (Stuts. 1913, p. 1012, 
as amended, Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937, Act 9091), a suit for 
determination of rights to water or the use thereof may be 
referred to the division of water resources immediately after 
[2] 
. theflling of the complaint and before the filing of pleadings 
by the' defendants. The words "issues involved," occurring 
in the, section, do not apply only to issues joined or framed 
by the pleadings. On the contrary, the court is given a broad 
discretion as to when and how much of the investigation or of 
co'nducting hearings and taking testimony should be referred. 
Id.-Procedure-Trial-Reference-Constitutionality of Stat-
ute.-Water CommIssion Act, § 24, providing for a reference 
2. See 26 Cal. Jur. 89. 
McK. Dig. References: 1-5. Waters, § 731; 6. Waters, §738. 
~ 
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to the division of water. resources, does not violate Const., 
art. VI, § 1, vesting judicial powers in the courts named, since 
no judicial powe,r is vested in or delegat~d to the division. 
The division operates merely in an advisory capacity to the 
court which itself performs the judicial function of determin-
ing the issues and rendering judgment. 
[Sa, Sb] rd. - Procedure-Trial-Reference_Report as Evidence. 
The report of the division of wa.ter resources as referee, pursu-
ant to an order authorized by Water Commission Act, § 24, 
is admissible in evidence as against objection that it is hearsay 
and incompetent, and that it was compiled from ex parte 
in vestiga tions. 
[4a,4b] rd. - Procedure - Trial - Reference - Report as Prima 
Facie Evidence.-The legislature has power to provide that 
the report of the division of water resources pursuant to a 
reference ordered under Water Commission Act, § 24, shall be 
prima facie evidence of the facts reported. Constitutional 
mandates are observed where the facts are not made incon-
trovertible and opportunity is given to refute them in court. 
[5] rd. - Procedure-Trial-Supervision of Distribution Pending 
Decision.-In v.iew of Water Commission Act, §§ 37, 37a, 
and Code Civ. Proc., § 187, in an action to quiet title to water 
rights in a river, the trial court has authority, after submis-
sion of the case, to make an interlocutory order directing the 
division of water resources, through a water master, to super-
vise the distribution of water in accord with the division's 
report pending the adoption of findings and conclusions, and 
directing that the cost of such supervision be apportioned 
among the water users, where in the circumstances such super-
vision is necessary. 
[6] Id. - Procedure - Judgments-Subsequent Orders-Distribu_ 
tion Through Water Master.-Following the jUdgment in an 
actiol), to quiet title to water rights, the court has power by 
supplementary order, to direct that the division of water re-
sources, through a water master, supe.rvise the distribution of 
water during the current irrigation season in accord with the 
provisions of the judgment, and that the cost thereof be 
apportioned among the water users after opportunity to be 
heard thereon, where the evidence shows the necessity for 
such order to preserve the public peace, convenience and wel-
fare and to prevent waste, and where moreover the waters 
had previously been distributed through the services of a 
water master and no one is deprived of waters to which he 
is justly entitled. 
I 
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